



4 August 2017

Senator Alex Gallacher
Chair
Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee

Dear Chair,

CPD welcomes the inquiry into the implications of climate change for Australia's national security (the Inquiry). You invited a submission from CPD in your letter dated 23 June 2017, due to our work on climate security since 2014.

CPD was submission 169 to the 2016 Defence White Paper process, and quoted in the 2015 report by the External Panel of Experts on the White Paper, *Guarding Against Uncertainty*. In June 2015, CPD released a major report on the issue, [The Longest Conflict: Australia's Climate Security Challenge](#), covered extensively in the national press. We've subsequently written nationally and internationally on climate security and hosted events on the topic, including a roundtable with Sherri Goodman, former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Environmental Security) 1993 to 2001, and member of the Center for Climate and Security's Advisory Board.

CPD works closely with the Department of Defence on Australia's climate security agenda. In late 2015, CPD briefed respectively the Chief of Army, Lieutenant-General Angus Campbell and the Chief of the Navy Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, on issues of climate security. CPD is also a founding participant in the Climate Security Working Group for the Asia Pacific, chaired by the US Center for Climate and Security.

A rigorous examination by the Federal Parliament of climate security is certainly overdue. Key allies of Australia, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, have led the world in addressing climate security for a decade. Overall, Australia has slipped further behind the advances of our allies, undermining our own long-term security as a result. There have been more positive developments recently. The 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP16) acknowledged climate security, senior ranks of our military have shown greater acceptance of the challenges, and defence colleges conduct training on the topic. But we have a long way to go still to catch up to best practice of the US and the UK.

Climate change is a distinctly 21st century security challenge requiring an equally contemporary response. Meeting the challenge requires recalibrating our traditional approach to defence, foreign policy and aid. Twentieth century notions of national security and diplomacy are now insufficient for the strategic outlook we face. The priorities of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) must be expanded. Barriers to better collaboration and information sharing between relevant government agencies must be eliminated. The entrenched policy community on security and international policy must be widened. And government must become adept at planning for multiple futures, war-gaming different, complex scenarios and their likely impact.

Australia can become a regional leader on climate security and climate diplomacy. By working constructively and closely with our regional neighbours and partners alike, Australia can help corral a community of nations into planning, preparing and adapting for a new security environment.

CPD sets out its submission according to Parts A to D of the terms of reference for the Inquiry. Our recommendations are also outlined below.

Recommendations according to the Terms of Reference

Part B – role of both humanitarian and military responses

1. In the ADF's strategic plans, update the ADF's role to provide equal priority to the following roles alongside fighting and winning interstate war:
 - a. providing humanitarian and disaster relief;
 - b. undertaking peace keeping and stabilisation missions; and
 - c. protecting supply of and access to natural resources including food, water and energy.
2. Plan for changed deployment patterns for the ADF with greater emphasis on humanitarian and disaster relief.
3. Invest in the ADF's effectiveness to operate in a climate changed world.
4. Improve interoperability and coordination with regional allies.

Part C – capacity and preparedness of Australia's national security agencies

5. Develop a National Climate Security Strategy.
6. Improve the government's approach to collaboration on climate security at home and abroad by:
 - a. creating a Climate Change and Resource Security Envoy; and
 - b. establishing an informal working group led by Department of Defence to expand sources of intelligence and information gathering and exchange.

Part D – role of Australia's overseas development assistance agencies

7. Forge an integrated policy framework on climate change across defence, foreign affairs and aid.
8. Expand the circles of influence for making relevant international policy on climate change.
9. Use aid policy to invest in climate resilience and adaptation of vulnerable regional neighbours.

Yours faithfully

Rob Sturrock

Policy Director

Part A: Threats and long-term risks posed by climate change to national and international security

Climate change is a uniquely 21st century security challenge. It is becoming more severe more quickly, with the world on track for a 3-4 Celsius temperature shift by 2100. It presents an acute challenge for Australia's economy, society and health and wellbeing. We are also one of the more vulnerable developed societies to climate change, and our region is on the frontline of major, destabilising climatic impacts.ⁱ

Asia is the most exposed region to low elevation climatic impacts like flooding and displacement,ⁱⁱ and has more than 90 per cent of the world's exposure to tropical cyclones.ⁱⁱⁱ Between 1996-2015, six of the world's ten most affected countries by extreme weather events (measured by fatalities and economic losses) were in Asia: Myanmar, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Thailand.^{iv} The Indo-Pacific region has the world's fastest growing economic hubs, its most populated cities, and the majority of the world's poor. It also has the greatest vulnerability to climate-induced humanitarian and natural disasters such as severe storms, flooding and extreme heat, as well as the flow-on effects such as damage to economic and social infrastructure, disease outbreak, malnutrition and food and water shortages. This is a volatile mix of factors that heightens the security risk posed to Australia.

As detailed in *The Longest Conflict*, climate change is the ultimate threat multiplier (for more information please see Chapter 1 pages 18-20).^v There are a range of scenarios in our region where climate change could act as a threat multiplier, such as flooding of China's industrial hubs on the Pearl River Delta, forced displacement from extreme weather events in the South Pacific, or intense heatwaves and infrastructure outages in South Asia.

Climate change will make existing geopolitical threats, like resource scarcity, more punishing. Importantly, Australians already understand this. In a poll commissioned by CPD in June 2015, 68 percent of respondents agreed that damage to our food supply chain and to our agricultural industry due to increases in extreme weather was a national security threat. In the same poll, 63 percent of respondents agreed that increased international competition for food, water and energy resources in our region was a national security threat.

CPD concurs with the US Department of Defense (USDoD) in its report, *National security implications of climate-related risks and a changing climate* (referred to in Part A of the Inquiry's terms of reference).

A full summary of the threats and long-term risks posed by climate change is in *The Longest Conflict* (see Chapter 1, pages 15-18 on our region's direct and indirect vulnerability, and Chapter 2 for long run impacts on health, wellbeing and the economy).

Part B: Role of humanitarian and military response and the means by which responses implemented

Recommendations in this section

1. In ADF strategic plans, update the ADF's role to provide equal priority to non-war functions as war functions, such as:
 - a. providing humanitarian and disaster relief;
 - b. undertaking peace keeping and stabilisation missions; and
 - c. protecting supply of and access to natural resources including food, water and energy.
2. Plan for change deployment patterns for the ADF with greater emphasis on humanitarian and disaster relief.
3. Invest in the ADF's effectiveness to operate in a climate changed world.
4. Improve interoperability and coordination with regional allies.

Contemporary roles of the ADF

The nature of climate security threats, outlined in Part A, means a changed security environment for the Australian Defence Force. It also means that the ADF's non-war functions will be as important as its war functions in maintaining regional stability and defending Australia's national interests.

The Australian public are live to this point. In 2015 CPD commissioned Essential Media to examine public expectations of the role of the ADF. Respondents were asked what the main responsibilities for the ADF were, out of five choices: i) fighting conventional wars; ii) providing disaster relief to communities affected by natural disasters; iii) providing assistance in humanitarian crises; iv) undertaking peacekeeping missions; and v) protecting Australia's food, water and energy resources. When aggregating what respondents believed were the top two priorities from these choices, the results were, in descending order:

1. providing disaster relief to affected communities (47 per cent);
2. protecting Australia's resources (45 per cent);
3. peacekeeping missions overseas (41 per cent); and
4. fighting conventional wars (37 per cent).

As the ADF updates its strategic plans and service-level doctrines, it should provide equal priority for non-war functions alongside war functions, such as:

- responding effectively to demands for humanitarian and disaster relief from neighbouring countries;
- undertaking peace keeping and stabilisation missions to countries of direct relevance to Australia's national security; and
- protecting Australia's supply of, and access to, natural resources including food, water and energy.

This will ensure a more contemporary policy framework across the three services as the ADF works to remain effective in a climate changed world, prepared for traditional and non-traditional threats.

Planning and preparing for changed deployment patterns

The key risk to the ADF is the very real prospect of dealing with multiple, concurrent disasters within Australia (or the region), and the contemporaneous demand for peace-keeping, stabilisation and disaster relief missions abroad. One scenario, for example, is the ADF needing to respond to a regional request for a large-scale HADR deployment in the aftermath of a severe tropical storm, whilst also responding to a natural disaster domestically.

Increased demands will in turn place new stresses and demands on the personnel, assets and energy supply chains of the ADF. CPD sets out more analysis on these issues in Chapter 2 of *The Longest Conflict* pages 23-24.

It is important that as Defence assesses its future operating environment, it addresses changing deployment patterns like those above.

Ensuring the effectiveness of the ADF to operate in a climate changed environment

DWP16 was a catalyst for massive investment in defence capabilities for the next several decades. The Australian Government's plans emphasise lethality and combat operations. Yet the ADF also requires capability, capacity and resilience to successfully adapt to the full spectrum of climate impacts like increasingly providing HADR. Current investment plans must better integrate the non-war functions of the ADF in order for the services to be adequately prepared for climate security challenges.

For example, the Government intends to invest approximately \$90 billion on new naval ships and submarines, the largest recapitalisation since World War II, through the 2017 Naval Shipbuilding Plan (Naval Plan).^{vi} The Naval Plan sets out a range of upgraded naval capabilities focused largely on a range of combative operations, but does not explicitly identify the importance of HADR missions, how the Navy can be best prepared for future HADR missions, or why such mission form an important part of Australia's security interests in the region.

Similarly, as the Naval Plan intends to spend more than \$1 billion on modern shipyard infrastructure, adapting to climatic impacts is vital. For instance, rising sea levels and storm surges over time could severely impede the shipbuilding program. For instance, in its assessment of the naval shipbuilding capability of Australia in 2015, the RAND Corporation, which was commissioned by DoD, flagged the strategic risk of relying on a limited number of shipyards, and the vulnerability to natural disasters that could shut down shipbuilding capacity for periods of time.^{vii} Compare this to standard-setting actions of the USDoD at the Norfolk naval station in Virginia, where it has been actively planning for rising sea levels for the last 13 years.^{viii} Whilst DWP 16 correctly acknowledges climatic impacts on our defence estate, Australia has still not seen anything like the longstanding, on-the-ground action undertaken at Norfolk. The prospect of similar planning, despite massive investment commitments already made by the government, remains uncertain.

The ADF should also be transitioning to renewable energy as part of a risk management approach that reduces fossil fuels dependency and diversifies supply. Within the defence establishment there have been small projects on alternative fuels^{ix} but large-scale

transition is not a current priority. In contrast stands the US Navy with its Great Green Fleet (GGF) using alternative fuels. The GGF is 'able to go farther, stay longer and deliver more firepower'.^x The US Navy touts the use of renewables as a way to also 'increase resiliency' and enable continued operations in the event of commercial grid disruption.

Given the above, set out below is a list of key actions to be undertaken to ensure the effectiveness of the ADF in tackling climate change, including maintaining the Defence estate (also available at Chapter 5 of *The Longest Conflict* pages 39-40).

Risk area	ADF vulnerability	Risk reduction measures
Capability to deploy the ADF on missions	Energy insecurity has potential to disrupt supply chains and immobilise military assets. This risk is heightened in remote or harsh locations (e.g. Middle East) or energy poor areas (e.g. Philippines).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Improved energy efficiency of current assets and equipment such as military shelters, base generators, vehicle batteries and operating systems. ○ Shift to incorporate increased proportion of renewables on-site. ○ Decarbonisation of energy usage in military assets ○ Enhanced interoperability with regional allies through combination of above options.
	Inadequate equipment and technology to respond to specific threats such as extreme weather and disaster incidents, which negates ADF ability to respond.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Development and implementation of procurement policies which explicitly incorporate climatic threats and identify equipment necessary to address future challenges.
	Inadequate supply of relevant, trained personnel for deployment on missions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Workforce capability development including training, education and targeted employment/recruitment of personnel to address identified gaps (also in Capacity).
Capacity of the ADF to respond	Competing international and domestic demands for humanitarian assistance, disaster support and peace keeping/stabilisation missions that the ADF is unable to supply.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Strategic planning which identifies cascading security priorities for the ADF including triage principles for multiple, concurrent climatic threats. ○ Strategic planning with regional allies to identify critical vulnerabilities and development of strategy to enable coordinated future response. ○ Workforce capacity development including training,

		education and targeted employment/recruitment of personnel to address identified capacity gaps (also in Capability).
	Degrading of, or damage to, military infrastructure such as bases and ports undermining deployment ability.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Mandatory audits of all military infrastructure to identify those areas at greatest risk to climate change damage and changing environmental conditions. ○ Ongoing implementation of adaptation measures to reduce risk of degradation.
Resilience of ADF to climatic changes in operating environment	<p>Increased difficulty for the ADF to adapt to operating environment both in terms of harshness (e.g. extreme heat) difficulty (e.g. frequent extreme weather events).</p> <p>Physical damage or strain on infrastructure, equipment and other key assets undermines long-term effectiveness of ADF.</p> <p>Risks to the health and safety of ADF personnel undermines capacity and capability.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Audit and modelling to identify current vulnerabilities in assets and equipment. ○ Acquisition and adaptation of equipment to withstand tougher environmental conditions. ○ Protection and retrofitting of relevant assets. ○ Enhanced health, safety and training procedures for ADF.

Improving interoperability and coordination with regional allies

There is a real opportunity for Australia to deepen its regional engagement and strengthen our partnerships. Australia can be a valued contributor to preserving regional human security via non-threatening engagement and constructive regional cooperation. In 2016, Chief of Army Lieutenant-General Campbell publically acknowledged the importance of international cooperation in his speech to the Chief of Army's Exercise, stating that the ADF will need to continue to work in 'multi-national settings...if complex problems that defy boundaries [like climate change] are to be resolved'.^{xi}

In the immediate future, DoD should work to improve the interoperability with our allies as they undertake adaptation measures. Australia performs well in the areas of expertise, training and joint military exercises, and should use its strong performance to drive even greater regional coordination and cohesion in tackling climate security issues such as improved HADR operations. The activities of the 2014 and 2016 Rim of the Pacific Exercises (RIMPAC) are prime examples of the benefits of interoperability with regional partners.^{xii}

More information on what Australia has done in recent times, and how interoperability with key allies and partners can be improved is set out on pages 40 to 42 of *The Longest Conflict*.

Part C: the capacity and preparedness of Australia's relevant national security agencies to respond to climate change risks in our region

Recommendations

5. Develop a National Climate Security Strategy
6. Improve the government's approach to collaboration on climate security at home and abroad by:
 - a. creating a Climate Change and Resource Security Envoy
 - b. establishing an informal working group led by Defence to expand sources of intelligence and information gathering and exchange in and outside government.

Undoubtedly, Australia's national security agencies have the capacity and skill to plan and prepare for, and respond to, climate security threats. What they lack is a strategic policy framework, sophisticated collaboration across agencies and political leadership from relevant Ministers. Whilst these three elements are lacking, Australia will not be suitably prepared for impending climate security threats.

There have been positive developments recently that demonstrate a slow building momentum for better preparedness on climate security. Senior military leaders are increasingly prepared to signal their support for better climate security policies, for instance the speech provided by Chief of the Army Lieutenant-General Campbell highlighted earlier.^{xiii} CPD believes this reflects a gradual but growing acceptance of climate security at senior ranks.

Equally positive is the shifting culture and approach elsewhere in the defence establishment. Increasingly, defence colleges offer training opportunities and other workshops for junior and mid-ranking officers to better understand climate security. The ADF's future leaders are thus far more likely to be familiar with climate security and how to respond.

However Australia's policy responses overall can be summarised as parts lacking a whole. A more detailed account of the past ten years of climate security action and inaction is set out in Chapter 4 of *The Longest Conflict* pages 31-34. It's time to move beyond piecemeal efforts treating climate security as incidental. Our key allies the United States and the United Kingdom are demonstrating best practice on strategic planning and preparedness. The one advantage of Australia being a laggard on climate security is that we can emulate and adapt best practice to our own situation and play catch up quickly.

2016 Defence White Paper was only a first step

The treatment of climate security in DWP16 was limited and is not a comprehensive strategy for climate security challenges. Climate change was not at the centre of the strategic outlook as a key driver of security concerns for Australia. Rather it was listed as one variable exacerbating state fragility 'within our immediate neighbourhood'. It framed climate security as presenting challenges to which government should react and respond when crises occur. It correctly acknowledged that Australia would face more requests for

HADR because our immediate neighbours in the South Pacific are particularly vulnerable to climate change. It also correctly acknowledged that the defence estate will need to be actively maintained against extreme weather and sea level rises. Yet the limited treatment of climate security missed major elements of the threats posted including the resource scarcity challenges and threat multiplier dimensions of climate change mentioned in Part A of this submission.

In the long-term, DWP16 risks being a tragically missed opportunity to put climate security at the heart of strategic planning and policy formulation, akin to what the US and UK have done for almost ten years.

Australia needs a holistic approach to climate security

Like dealing with any security threat, Australia needs a credible plan for climate security. The Australian Government should develop a National Climate Security Strategy as part of a comprehensive policy approach. This Strategy would provide the overarching direction for the DoD to ensure the ADF's effectiveness, readiness and resilience, as well as position Australia to be a strategic leader in climate security. There is a range of best practice approaches from overseas that offer pathways for developing such a strategy, these are set out in Chapter 3 of *The Longest Conflict*.

As a starting point, this Strategy should examine the following risks:

- the increasing need for national and regional disaster relief;
- identifying where climate change will act as a threat multiplier in the region, including:
 - regional large-scale population increases as well as forced movements and displacements;
 - vulnerable communities at heightened risk of climate change incidents (e.g. extreme weather, drought);
 - resource insecurity in the region and potential for political and social instability (food, water, energy);
- potential geopolitical 'hotspots' as a result of climate change and its effects; and
- the overall effect of climate change on the defence estate including preparedness of the ADF across capacity, capability and resilience.

Key lessons from overseas plans include the need for such a strategy to instruct the development of detailed unit-level planning within the civilian structure as well as at force level. Specific roles, responsibilities, actionable timeframes and internal reporting requirements should all be identified so that the Strategy on paper becomes reality.

Undertaking the above also requires planning for 'multiple futures' – for instance a world with 3 degree warming and its corresponding impacts versus a world of 4 degree warming and the like. It involves our establishment understanding different yet equally complex security scenarios that may arise, and gaming out suitable responses and contingencies. Futures planning also helps highlight requisite, and potentially missing, capabilities and

capacities. This type of work will involve a level of forecasting, planning and imagination that is rare in government.

There is untapped capability within and outside government that can greatly assist with this strategic planning. A new type of collaboration and intelligence sharing, hitherto unseen from the defence and security establishment, is required to utilise it.

Developing a better approach to collaboration on climate security

Whilst collaboration is gradually improving on broader climate change policy within the Australian Public Service, we remain well short of embedded collaboration able to produce the best strategic plans and preparedness approaches. The DoD can drive more positive change in this area.

One option for motivating better collaboration in the short term could be the creation of a Climate and Resource Security Envoy, to be jointly funded by the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs. A similar position was used in the UK in recent years. The Envoy could not only work across the relevant government agencies in facilitating more integrated policy, but could be Australia's representative to the region on climate security and climate diplomacy. A properly resourced Envoy would also send a positive signal to our neighbours and allies alike that we prioritise such policy challenges.

Further, a Climate Security Strategy requires a broadening of channels from which intelligence and insight are drawn in making policy. Government agencies like CSIRO and the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) can regularly provide updated forecasts on sea level rises, temperature shifts and other key climatic impacts. The defence and security establishment would also benefit enormously from opening information channels significantly outside government, such as exchanging risk management approaches with Australian corporations in industries most affected by climate change (e.g. transport, agribusiness, or property development). Tapping the expertise and resources of relevant actors outside government will improve strategic planning and preparedness activities. The creation of an informal working group led by DoD, that can encompass the array of stakeholders above, would be a prudent starting point to more mature information and intelligence sharing, and joined-up policy development.

Internationally, the Australian Government should improve its intelligence sharing relationships with European allies whose governments are rigorously preparing for climate change. For instance, France has South Pacific interests and is even coordinating a detailed study on how climate change impacts defence coordination in the South Pacific, due in 2019.^{xiv} Yet the intelligence sharing potential of the France-Australia bilateral relationship remains largely untapped.

With the Australian Government reformulating our intelligence machinery in the creation of a Home Affairs Ministry, there may be appetite now to consider creating better collaboration and opening intelligence channels across the national security agencies.

Part D: the role of Australia's overseas development assistance in climate change mitigation and adaptation more broadly

Recommendations

7. Forge an integrated policy framework on climate change across defence, foreign affairs and aid.
8. Expand the circles of influence for making relevant international policy on climate change
9. Use aid policy to invest in climate resilience and adaptation of vulnerable regional neighbours

Australia should be a regional leader in assisting our neighbours and partners to prepare for a climate changed world. We have the opportunity for deepening not just our security ties throughout the Indo-Pacific, but our bilateral and multilateral relationships on climate change more broadly, doing it in a way that is constructive, sustainable and non-threatening. This requires an integrated policy framework across defence, foreign affairs and aid.

Having a more sophisticated approach to climate change policy regionally helps Australia tap into our under-used 'soft power' potential in international affairs. The international community has a favourable view of Australia and its contributions internationally. For the past three years, Australia has been in the top 10 of the Soft Power Index developed by Portland Communications^{xv}, and in a new global poll showed Australia was ranked 2nd out of 25 nations for 'a positive influence on world affairs'.^{xvi} Australia should more rigorously deploy its soft power assets, such as aid investments, to demonstrate constructive regional leadership at a time when countries are positively disposed to us.

Currently the UK and France are demonstrating more climate leadership in our region than Australia. The UK's 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Security and Defence Review commits to working with ASEAN on improving coordination of HADR, especially with Indonesia and Malaysia as two key member states.^{xvii} As mentioned in the previous section, the French Government is coordinating a study on the defence impacts of climate change in the South Pacific. Australia should perform a stronger leadership role in improving coordination and interoperability with regional partners. We should not be letting European allies shoulder the responsibility in corralling our neighbours to take climate change more seriously.

Having an integrated approach to climate change internationally will require greatly improved collaboration between the establishments for defence, foreign affairs and aid. It will also involve broadening those circles of influence to involve relevant non-government organisations from civil society and business with intelligence, insight and experience that can greatly contribute to policy formulation.

Given Australia faces increasing regional requests to provide HADR, it is obvious that we should make more strategic use of its aid and development budget to invest in the climate preparedness and resilience of our more vulnerable neighbours, like those in South-East Asia. This could include boosting the domestic capacities of our most vulnerable

neighbours to ensure that their health, energy, and social services capabilities are prepared for the full spectrum of climate change impacts.

Such aid investments can increase the resilience and self-sufficiency of our vulnerable neighbours to withstand the impact of natural and humanitarian disasters for example, in turn reducing the likelihood of requests for an emergency response by the ADF.

It also presents an economic opportunity for Australia to export relevant technology and services in climate adaptation and mitigation. This should be of interest to the Australian Government given its standing commitment to grow the local defence industry via ADF capability investments.

REFERENCES

- ⁱ More information on our region's direct vulnerability is set out in Chapter 1 of *The Longest Conflict* pages 15-16.
- ⁱⁱ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, 373
- ⁱⁱⁱ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, cited above, 1346.
- ^{iv} Asia Development Bank, [A Region at Risk: The human dimensions of climate change in the Asia and the Pacific](#), 2017, 3.
- ^v CPD, *The Longest Conflict*, 2015, Chapter 1 pages 18-20.
- ^{vi} Department of Defence, [Naval Shipbuilding Plan](#), 13.
- ^{vii} RAND Corporation, [Australia's Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise: Preparing for the 21st Century](#), 2015, xxxii.
- ^{viii} Werrell, Caitlin and Femia, Francesco '[Weather Channel: 13 years of military planning for sea level rise](#)', 2 February 2017.
- ^{ix} For instance see the [Carnegie Wave Project](#)
- ^x U.S. Navy, [The Great Green Fleet](#).
- ^{xi} Australian Army, [Chief of Army's Opening Address to the Chief of Army's Exercise 2016](#), 6 September 2016.
- ^{xii} Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, [RIMPAC 2014](#) and [RIMPAC 2016](#).
- ^{xiii} Australian Army, [Chief of Army's Opening Address to the Chief of Army's Exercise 2016](#), cited above.
- ^{xiv} South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting, [Joint Communiqué](#), 6 April 2017, paragraph 16.
- ^{xv} Portland Communications & USC Center on Public Diplomacy, [The Soft Power 30: A global ranking of soft power 2017](#), 40.
- ^{xvi} World Economic Forum, '[These countries have the most positive influence on the world](#)', 7 July 2017.
- ^{xvii} UK Government, [National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom](#), 59.